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Stephen Fry and Charles Hartshorne: God and unjustified suffering1 
 
Donald Wayne Viney 
 
The work of Stephen Fry is a treasure chest with many nuggets worth saving, but some of 
it is fool’s gold. Who could not enjoy the television series (Kingdom) in which he starred as the 
country solicitor, Peter Kingdom? Who could not delight in his playful reflections on the 
pedantry of language Nazis (available on YouTube)? Recently, however, he was asked on RTE 
One (Irish radio) by the well-known interviewer, Gay Bryne, what he’d say to God if, contrary to 
his atheism, he found himself, after his death, at the pearly gates. Fry’s response, born of moral 
outrage, is worth appreciating both for its articulate summary of what passes as “the new 
atheism” but also for the profound ignorance it reveals in an otherwise well-educated spirit.  
Fry would confront the Almighty he imagines with a list of ills not caused by human 
beings that lead to terrible suffering such as “bone cancer in children” and “insects whose life-
cycle is to burrow into the eyes of children and make them blind.” The deity that creates a 
universe in which these things occur is, among other things, “capricious, mean-minded, stupid,” 
“a maniac,” and “a monster” worthy of no one’s respect. Fry rightly says that atheism is not 
simply a matter of denying that God exists; it also involves asking what God would be like if 
God existed. According to Fry, God “could easily have made a creation” in which these and 
other examples of gratuitous suffering did not exist. It seems that it is less the goodness of God 
than God’s power that is the fulcrum of Fry’s argument. The defects that he alleges in God’s 
character stem from God’s failing to do the right thing when it was so clearly (according to Fry) 
within God’s power to do otherwise.  
As I listened to Fry’s impassioned complaint, I could not help but imagine Charles 
Hartshorne (1897-2000), the American philosopher, nodding in agreement in rejecting what 
Hartshorne called “the tyrant view of God.” But Hartshorne’s appreciation would have stopped 
short of approval because of Fry’s uncritical acceptance of a theological view that Hartshorne 
considered himself and others to have discredited. It has now been a bit over thirty years since 
Hartshorne spoke of the tyrant deity in the aptly titled, Omnipotence and Other Theological 
Mistakes (State University of New York Press, 1984), a book written for a popular audience that 
was modestly successful. It has been sixty-seven years since Hartshorne published the more 
technically sophisticated classic, The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God (Yale, 
1948). Hartshorne was well-known to philosophers and theologians throughout his lengthy life 
and he achieved a modicum of recognition beyond that circle—see, for example, Greg 
Easterbrook’s interview with Hartshorne, “A Hundred Years of Thinking About God: A 
                                                          
1 Originally published on-line at: http://www.processphilosophy.org/omnipotence-and-other-theological-mistakes-
charles-hartshornes-alternative-to-atheism.html under the title “Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes: 
Donald Wayne Viney responds to Stephen Fry on Atheism with an invitation to consider Charles Hartshorne’s 
Alternative” (2015). 
Philosopher Soon to be Rediscovered,” in U. S. News and World Report (February 23, 1998), pp. 
61, 65.  
Unlike, Fry, Hartshorne was a theist, more precisely, a “neoclassical” or “dipolar” theist. 
The basic idea is that it is necessarily the case that God acts and is acted upon by the world and 
its creatures. In agreement with Fry, Hartshorne thought it important to ask how best to conceive 
the nature of God. This question, posed as a hypothetical, is no less central to atheism than it is to 
theism: Assuming there is a God, what must God be like? Where Hartshorne parts company most 
dramatically from Fry is in questioning the classical concept of omnipotence, the idea that God 
must have the power, unilaterally, to decide any and every particular detail of the world. 
Hartshorne went so far as to say that this idea of divine power is “not even coherent enough to be 
false.” Hartshorne considered the classical idea to be a mistake because it is power divorced from 
social, evolutionary, and developmental contexts. For Hartshorne, power, including the eminent 
form of power, is always, and necessarily, power over against other beings with some degree of 
power. A consequence of Hartshorne’s view is that tragedy is possible, even in a God-created 
world, for shared creativity or power is a risky business. Tragedies, moreover, are tragedies even 
for God, at least if one wishes to retain the idea of God’s goodness—as Hartshorne argued, there 
is divine passivity as well as divine activity. 
More than one of those who call themselves “new atheists” respond to philosophers like 
Hartshorne by accusing them of being liberals who wish to make belief in God intellectually 
respectable. I don’t know what Fry thinks about this. I hope that he sees it for the dodge that it is. 
Ad hominem argument is a two-edged blade. Perhaps certain atheists simply want to make it easy 
on themselves by not considering the most sophisticated views of their opponents. As 
entertaining as personal attacks can be, it is finally best to set them aside and deal honestly with 
the arguments.   
Any number of philosophers and theologians have followed Hartshorne’s line of 
thinking—some with little or no acquaintance with Hartshorne’s writings—so it is an instance of 
what Hartshorne called “cultural lag” for atheists like Fry not to have gotten the message. It may 
well be that Fry (and English new atheists generally) don’t bother much with what an American 
philosopher says, unless he or she is an atheist. On the other hand, it was an English theist of 
high learning, transplanted to America, who said, “The worship of glory arising from power is 
not only dangerous: it arises from a barbaric conception of God. I suppose that even the world 
itself could not contain the bones of those slaughtered because of men intoxicated by its 
attraction.” (A. N. Whitehead, Religion in the Making, 1926, chapter II, part I). Hartshorne, who 
knew Whitehead personally, agreed with this sentiment.             
The most recent of Hartshorne’s books to be published was Creative Experiencing: A 
Philosophy of Freedom (State University of New York Press, 2011), a book he completed but 
did not manage to publish. Here is what Hartshorne says in that book (p. 98): 
[Dipolar theism] does not assign to God what many have meant by omnipotence, from 
which it followed that divine wisdom and power simply determined details of the world, 
implying that creaturely freedom determined nothing or was not freedom at all. God has 
optimal or best possible power, surpassing that of any conceivable other; so that the 
divine power is the greatest conceivable. However, genuine power is power over those 
who have some power of their own. Power cannot be monopolized, even in the best form 
of power. Something is left undecided for others to decide. The classical problem of evil 
was in this way a pseudo-problem, employing a pseudo-concept of divine power. Not 
simply human freedom has to be taken into account; any creature simply as such must be 
an above-zero form of less-than-divine freedom. What I call the “formula of immanence 
and transcendence” is as follows: properties optimal in deity are less than optimal but still 
positively present in all creatures. Thus, if love is optimal in God no creature is totally 
without love in that word’s most general meaning. Similarly, if freedom is optimal in 
God no creature is wholly without it. I take the new physics to make this compatible with 
our knowledge. It alters the problem of evil radically.  
This quote can be considered as a way of tempering Fry’s views and as an invitation to entertain 
more adequate ideas about the meaning of power. I consider it an extreme exaggeration to think 
that Hartshorne’s view is the last word on this or any other subject. Nevertheless, Hartshorne’s 
critique of the concept of omnipotence introduced novel and illuminating perspectives on the 
problems of theodicy that it is intellectually irresponsible to ignore.   
 
 
 
